D.E.W., Inc. v. Local 93, Laborers' International Union of North America

957 F.2d 196 | Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | 1992

enforcedCited 91 timesBATTLE_TESTEDFederal (5th Circuit)
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What This Case Means for Subcontractors

D.E.W., a general contractor, signed an adoption agreement to contribute to union benefit funds. The contractor paid into the funds only for union workers, not non-union workers. The court ruled that the adoption agreement required contributions for all laborers—union and non-union alike—because the agreement incorporated the collective bargaining agreement's contribution provisions by reference. This means contractors cannot pick and choose which employees trigger benefit fund obligations.

Key Takeaways

  • When you adopt or flow down a collective bargaining agreement, you must contribute to benefit funds for all similarly situated employees, not just union members.
  • Courts will enforce broad language in adoption agreements that incorporates CBA provisions by reference, even if you didn't sign the original CBA yourself.
  • Audit your payroll practices now: if you have an adoption agreement with any benefit fund, verify you're making contributions for all covered workers regardless of union status.

Adoption agreement unambiguously incorporates contribution provisions for all laborer employees, union and non-union.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1992

Frequently Asked Question

If I sign an adoption agreement for union benefit funds, do I have to pay for non-union workers too?

Yes. If the adoption agreement incorporates the collective bargaining agreement's contribution provisions by reference, you must contribute for all similarly situated employees—both union and non-union. The court will enforce the broad language of the agreement regardless of whether you signed the original CBA.

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