Eslon Thermoplastics v. Dynamic Systems, Inc.
49 S.W.3d 891 | Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) | 2001
Holding Summary
A genuine issue of material fact exists whether the Mark 8 hookup work was performed under a separate contract with Tokyo Electron or under a modified subcontract incorporating a waiver of subrogation clause, precluding summary judgment.
There is a material fact issue as to whether the hookup was performed under a separate contract.
Related Cases
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy
Sovereign immunity bars a contractor's breach-of-contract suit against a state agency absent express legislative consent; neither the agency's conduct, contract terms, nor general statutes waive immunity from suit.
Martin K. Eby Construction Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit
A contractor must exhaust administrative remedies established by a regional transportation authority before pursuing breach of contract claims in court, even when the authority lacks governmental immunity from suit.
Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems, Inc.
A manufacturer must indemnify an innocent seller for products liability litigation costs under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 82.002(a), even if the seller did not sell the particular defective product that injured the plaintiff, provided the seller qualifies as a 'seller' under the statute.
Edwin P. Harrison, and United States of America, Party in Interest v. Westinghouse Savannah River Company
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that the False Claims Act broadly reaches false statements made to obtain government contract approval, not just false payment claims themselves.
Green International, Inc. v. Solis
No-damages-for-delay clauses in construction contracts need not meet the conspicuousness requirement established in Dresser for exculpatory negligence clauses, and such clauses are enforceable to bar delay damages absent specific exceptions.
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc.
A surety does not owe a common law duty of good faith to its principal, but good faith is a contractual condition precedent to indemnification, requiring proof of improper motive or willful ignorance rather than mere negligence.