Kenneth G. Hicks, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Brown Group, Inc., D/B/A Brown Shoe Company, Inc., Appellant/cross-Appellee

902 F.2d 630 | Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | 1990

enforcedCited 72 timesBATTLE_TESTEDTexas
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What This Case Means for Subcontractors

Kenneth Hicks sued Brown Shoe Company after being fired, claiming racial discrimination violated federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1981). A jury found the company guilty and awarded him $10,000 in punitive damages plus attorney fees. The appeals court upheld the verdict, ruling that discriminatory discharge is illegal because it destroys the core benefit of an employment contract. This matters to subcontractors because it establishes that race-based firing is actionable and can result in significant financial penalties for companies.

Key Takeaways

  • Discriminatory discharge based on race violates federal law and is fully actionable in court—companies cannot defend this conduct
  • Punitive damages and attorney fees are available remedies, not just back pay, making discrimination cases costly for employers
  • Document all employment decisions and communications to defend against discrimination claims; lack of clear documentation strengthens plaintiff cases

Discriminatory discharge goes to the very existence and nature of the employment contract.

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1990

Frequently Asked Question

Can a subcontractor or employee sue for being fired because of their race?

Yes. Federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1981) makes race-based firing illegal and actionable in court. An employee can recover punitive damages, attorney fees, and other remedies. Courts have consistently upheld these claims, so employers cannot defend discriminatory discharge on any grounds.

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