Robert Lilley, Cross-Appellee v. Btm Corporation, Cross-Appellant

958 F.2d 746 | Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | 1992

affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in partCited 208 timesFLAGSHIPTexas
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What This Case Means for Subcontractors

Robert Lilley sued BTM Corporation for age discrimination and retaliation after being fired. The court ruled that Lilley was properly classified as an employee and upheld his retaliation claim, awarding him $425,000 in damages plus attorney's fees and interest. For subcontractors, this case shows that courts broadly interpret who counts as an 'employee' under discrimination laws, and that firing someone in retaliation for complaining about age discrimination is illegal and costly.

Key Takeaways

  • Courts use a broad definition of 'employee' to protect workers under age discrimination laws—don't assume someone is a contractor just to avoid these protections
  • Retaliatory discharge (firing someone for complaining about discrimination) is a separate violation that can result in significant damages even if the original discrimination claim fails
  • Losing discrimination cases can cost tens of thousands in damages, attorney's fees, prejudgment interest, and court costs—proper classification and fair treatment are essential risk management

The term 'employee' is to be given a broad construction to effectuate remedial purposes.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1992

Frequently Asked Question

If I fire someone who complained about age discrimination, what legal trouble am I in?

You can face a retaliation claim separate from the original discrimination claim. Even if the discrimination claim fails, retaliation is its own violation. You could owe back pay, front pay, damages for emotional harm, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest—potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars.

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