Robert Lilley, Cross-Appellee v. Btm Corporation, Cross-Appellant
958 F.2d 746 | Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | 1992
Holding Summary
Lilley was properly determined to be an employee under the ADEA and Elliott-Larsen Act, and the court affirmed his retaliatory discharge claim but reversed the denial of prejudgment interest and remanded for recomputation of costs.
The term 'employee' is to be given a broad construction to effectuate remedial purposes.
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