United States ex rel. Kitchens to Go v. John C. Grimberg Co.
283 F. Supp. 3d 476 | District Court, E.D. Virginia | 2017
Holding Summary
A surety cannot enforce a no-damages-for-delay clause to limit Miller Act liability because such clauses contradict the statute's text and purpose by conditioning recovery on owner payment rather than the statutory 90-day period.
The Miller Act trumps conflicting suretyship principles such that a surety can only enforce contract terms to limit its Miller Act liability if those terms are consistent with the Act.
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