Zachry Construction Corporation v. Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas
449 S.W.3d 98 | Texas Supreme Court | 2014
Holding Summary
A no-damages-for-delay provision cannot shield an owner from liability for deliberately and wrongfully interfering with a contractor's work, even if the contract broadly purports to exclude all delay damages.
A no-damages-for-delay provision cannot shield the owner from liability for deliberately and wrongfully interfering.
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