Commercial Structures & Interiors, Inc. v. Liberty Education Ministries, Inc.

192 S.W.3d 827 | Court of Appeals of Texas | 2006

remandedCited 48 timesBATTLE_TESTEDTexas
View on Court Website

Holding Summary

A release agreement containing language to 'agree to assign' accounts receivable evidences only a future intent to assign, not a present transfer, and therefore does not effect an immediate assignment of causes of action without evidence of consummation.

Language unambiguously evidences intent to assign in future, not present transfer.

Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006

Related Cases

Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi

1992enforced

A municipality owes no duty to a subcontractor to ensure a general contractor provides valid payment bonds, and a subcontractor cannot recover from the municipality under quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, or negligence theories when the general contractor abandons the project.

Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.

1999voided

Sovereign immunity bars subcontractors from enforcing equitable liens against the United States Government, as the APA's waiver of immunity does not extend to claims for money damages.

Weize Co. v. Colorado Regional Construction, Inc.

2010affirmed

A general contractor violated Colorado's construction trust fund statute by failing to hold funds in trust for subcontractors and suppliers, and a lien release bond does not exempt contractors from trust fund obligations or excuse failure to record a lis pendens.

Rice v. Pinney

2001enforced

A county court has jurisdiction to determine immediate possession in a forcible detainer action even when a concurrent district court suit challenges title, provided the possession determination does not necessarily require resolving the title dispute.

Benchmark Bank v. Crowder

1996modified

A third party may be subrogated to a federal tax lien and foreclose on a homestead, but must compensate a non-liable spouse for their separate homestead interest.

Brown v. Bank of Galveston, National Ass'n

1998enforced

Bank's acts were not the producing cause of Brown's damages and did not violate the DTPA as a matter of law; judgment for Bank affirmed.