International Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC

179 Wash. 2d 274 | Washington Supreme Court | 2013

enforcedCited 87 timesBATTLE_TESTEDTexas
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What This Case Means for Subcontractors

A general partner in a marine welding partnership was injured while working as an independent contractor and tried to claim coverage under the partnership's liability insurance as a "third party." The Washington Supreme Court ruled against him, holding that general partners cannot be treated as third parties under insurance policies because partnership law makes them personally liable agents of the partnership. This means partners are considered insiders to partnership contracts, not outside parties eligible for third-party coverage.

Key Takeaways

  • General partners cannot claim third-party coverage under their own partnership's insurance policy—they are legally considered principals to partnership contracts, not third parties.
  • If you're a partner in a subcontracting firm, you cannot use the partnership's liability insurance to cover your own injuries or claims; you need separate personal coverage.
  • When a client requires additional insured status on your insurance certificate, make sure the policy actually covers the work you're doing and understand who qualifies as a covered party versus an excluded insider.

As a general partner, Boogaard does not qualify as a third party under the insured contract provision.

Washington Supreme Court, 2013

Frequently Asked Question

Can I claim coverage as a third party under my own partnership's liability insurance if I get injured?

No. Courts treat general partners as insiders and principals to partnership contracts, not third parties. You cannot use your partnership's insurance to cover your own injuries. You need separate personal coverage or workers' compensation if you're working as an employee of the partnership.

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