Secura Insurance v. Phillips 66 Co.

206 N.E.3d 1027 | Appellate Court of Illinois | 2022

remandedCited 1 timesSTANDARDTexas
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What This Case Means for Subcontractors

Premier Insulation had a master service agreement (MSA) with ConocoPhillips to work at a refinery. When ConocoPhillips assigned that MSA to Phillips 66, Phillips 66 claimed it was an additional insured under Premier's insurance policy. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that an assignment of an MSA counts as a written agreement for additional insured coverage purposes. This means when you assign a contract to another company, that company can claim insurance coverage without needing a separate written agreement.

Key Takeaways

  • When you assign a contract to another party, that assignment itself can satisfy the 'written agreement' requirement for additional insured status on your insurance policy.
  • An injured employee's employer doesn't need to be named as a defendant in the lawsuit for insurance coverage to apply—workers' compensation tort immunity rules can still trigger coverage obligations.
  • Review your MSAs carefully before assigning them, as assignment may automatically extend additional insured coverage to the assignee without requiring separate insurance documentation.

An assignment is a contract between the assignor and the assignee.

Appellate Court of Illinois, 2022

Frequently Asked Question

If I assign my contract to another company, do they automatically become an additional insured on my insurance?

According to this Illinois case, yes—an assignment of a master service agreement can satisfy the written agreement requirement for additional insured status. This means the company receiving your contract may have insurance coverage rights without needing a separate written agreement. Always check your insurance policy language and notify your insurer before assigning contracts.

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